Introduction
'Freedom Fighters', 'Terrorists', 'Rebels'-the list of labels for people struggling against political regimes in power is long, including different assumptions about the legitimacy of armed violent resistance. However, aft er the end of the East-West-confl ict, peace and confl ict studies seemed to have surpassed the discussion; the term freedom fi ghter is history, and since 9/11 the label 'terrorists' has become a broadly used term. One could guess several reason for this stronger academic uniformity to accept governments' legitimacy, so for example a liberal hegemony without global competition between political systems, or an improved knowledge on the brutal violence of revolutionary experiments.
Further arguments can be gained from the dimension confl ict scientists have been concentrating on during the last years, the economical aspect of insurgency violence. Two debates structured the fi eld: 1. the 'greed debate', focusing on motivation and possibilities of individuals to participate in violence; and 2. the 'New Wars debate', accounting for self-centric, corrupt war actors in the globalized 21st century. Both accounts base their explanations of rebels' behavior on neo-classical economic assumptions. What is the consequence? Rebel groups are either analyzed as Malthusian greedy poor who use their little value of life to enter the market of violence, or as scrupulous elites who misuse the grievances of people for their own agenda. Both accounts have seemingly unmasked the (pretending) idealistic fi ghters, representative for their social constituency, as a bunch of criminals-supporting the argument of the administrations crushing insurgencies in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, Palestine, Tibet, and elsewhere (Ballentine/Nitzschke 2003).
Th ereby peace and confl ict studies has been detached from broader studies on structural violence (Senghaas 1977), focusing strongly on direct violence (Egbert et al. 2005) . Th is has let to a step-by-step militarization of 'problem-solving' (Cox 1981) peace and confl ict studies. In consequence humanitarian interventions, for example, have become a quite unquestioned mean to stabilize confl icts. Critical positions remain voiceless in light of the astonishing brutality of war crimes conducted by rebel groups. Pictures on CNN of massacred children undermine critique on the mentioned 'humanitarian interventions' against the 'criminals' completely.
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My overall research objective is to contribute to a re-amalgamation of segregated research strands into a comprehensive socioeconomic analysis. Th e attempt of this paper is to sketch a research framework, which could function as a fi rst bridge between the insights into dynamics of direct and structural violence. It is based on a historical-materialist approach, elaborated by Antonio Gramsci for the analysis of the postWorld-War-I situation in Italy and adapted by international political economists for analyzing the dynamics of global orders during the last centuries.
Th e paper will start with two short accounts on the state-of-the art in peace and confl ict studies as well as in structural violence studies and then proceed by introducing some older progressive accounts of revolutionary violence, which can inform the debate further. Th e next section will outline the assumptions and the basic concepts of the historical-materialist approach. In the fourth section specifi c aspects of the overall framework will be reworked to adapt to the needs of an analysis of violent confl icts in post/neo-colonial areas. A summary and an outlook will conclude the paper.
Th e Political Economy of Resistance
Th e end of the Soviet Union led to the expectation of a fi nal end of challenges to a liberal world order (Fukuyama 1992). However, soon shocking massacres in the civil wars of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Somalia crushed the vision of a near global peace to pieces; not to forget the continuing struggles in Colombia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Confl ict research has been deprived of its theory of
